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Abstract Previous research suggests that most treaties are ineffective in ensuring
countries’ compliance with human rights standards. It has been argued, however, that
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) including ‘hard’ human rights standards can
withhold economic benefits and, thus, can have a real potential to substantially reduce
human rights violations. The following article questions this as existent work on the
effects of PTAs on human rights standards neglects a selection process underlying the
implementation of these treaties. Countries being aware of the ‘shadow of the future’
already take into account what may happen at the succeeding enforcement stage when
establishing a particular PTA. This implies that states agree on ‘hard’ human rights
standards in PTAs only if they have a general propensity to abide by human rights in
the first place. For testing the empirical implications of their argument, the authors
collected new data on PTAs in 1976/77-2009, and employ genetic matching techni-
ques. The results support the theoretical argument that PTAs are unlikely to affect
human rights compliance when controlling for the outlined selection problem.
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1 Introduction
According to the latest Amnesty International (2011) report, people suffered from
abuse, were tortured, or were constrained in their freedom of expression in almost 100
countries during the year 2010. Why does this occur? Why do some countries torture
their people while other countries comply with human rights standards and, conse-
quently, refrain from abusing, torturing, or repressing their people? A thorough and
systematic answer to these questions is certainly of interest to policy makers and non-
governmental organizations alike, and, in fact, scholars addressed this before (e.g., Cottier
2002; Goodman and Jinks 2003; 2004; Gould 2004; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui
2005; Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Keith 1999;
Landman 2005; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Moravcsik 1995; Neumayer 2005;
Risse et al. 1999; Schwarz 2004; Sen 2004; Simmons 2009; Vreeland 2008).
From a normative perspective, unfortunately, the majority of this literature claims
that, in general, human rights treaties do not seem to be an effective tool to improve
countries’ respect for human rights. This might be primarily due to missing enforce-
ment mechanisms that most, if not all, international human rights agreements lack in
their treaty design. In contrast, however, previous research suggests that preferential
trade agreements (PTAs) may be able to induce domestic policy changes and sub-
stantially reduce human rights violations. If these bilateral or regional treaties, which
aim at liberalizing trade between their member countries, additionally comprise ‘hard
human rights standards,’ trade benefits can be made conditional on treaty members’
compliance with international human rights.1 The logic for this claim is straightfor-
ward: by linking highly attractive gains from trade to the compliance with human
rights, PTAs offer a way to withhold economic benefits or impose economic sanc-
tions in the case of abuse, torture, or repression (Hafner-Burton 2005a).2 Hence in
contrast to general human rights treaties, PTAs if they comprise a hard human rights
standard, should lead to an increase in their member countries’ respect for human
rights.
While this seems to constitute good news for the compliance with human rights
and the role of PTAs in particular herein, from a more general perspective, we also
obtain support for the assertion that international institutions or regimes do (or at least
have the potential to) influence adverse governments via coercion, issue linkage, or
reputational effects toward ‘good behavior.’ Arguably, the pre-requisite is that this
logic holds and is empirically valid to the extent that international institutions,
1 The term ‘hard human rights standard’ (hard law) implies that non-compliance can be sanctioned by
withholding trade benefits. ‘Soft human rights standards’ (soft law), on the other hand, refer to the simple
mentioning of human rights practices in a treaty, while an enforcement mechanism is not given.
2 Although our study empirically focuses on the compliance with human rights standards, the theoretical
argument can be applied to other policy issue areas such as environmental degradation, labor standards, or
the impact of any international institution in general. For example, Bechtel and Tosun (2009) examine the
impact of PTAs in the field of environmental protection. Due to the availability of data, however, we
exclusively focus on PTAs and human rights compliance in this study.
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regimes, and PTAs as the focus of this research, are indeed effective instruments for
enforcing states’ compliance with human rights standards.
The following article questions this presumption. In fact, we argue that previous
work on PTAs and members’ human rights compliance neglects a selection process
underlying the formation of these treaties. Countries are likely to be aware of the
‘shadow of the future’ and, hence, they should already take into account what may
happen at the succeeding enforcement stage when establishing a particular PTA. This
implies that states should agree on hard human rights standards in PTAs only if they
have a general propensity to abide by human rights in the first place anyway. If this
selection process holds, it is crucial for studies examining the effectiveness of PTAs
in promoting human rights that both theory and empirics acknowledge the factors that
motivate countries to include hard human rights standards and those that do not
require the inclusion of any human rights clauses. Otherwise, it may well be that the
findings we obtain are spurious or biased.
Due to this rationale, the literature on the rational design of international institu-
tions (e.g., Koremenos et al. 2001; Koremenos 2005) serves as the foundation of our
research as it emphasizes that states take into account what may happen at the
succeeding enforcement stage already when they establish a particular regime (see
also von Stein 2005; Simmons and Hopkins 2005; Landman 2005; Bernhagen 2008;
Hill 2010). Consequently, scholars need to acknowledge countries’ preferences for
the establishment of international institutions, regimes, and PTAs when studying their
effects in order to avoid biased inferences, since countries’ preferences for
the establishment of an international institution and the institution’s effectiveness,
are just ‘two faces of the same coin’ (e.g., Fearon 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001;
Koremenos 2005).
For empirically testing our argument, we collected new data on PTAs in 1976/
77-2009 and employ genetic matching techniques for addressing the outlined
self-selection issue. Our results confirm that PTAs are unlikely to affect human
rights compliance when controlling for selection. Hence, countries seem indeed
to anticipate what might happen at the enforcement stage when establishing
PTAs, since they only include hard human rights standards in the first place if
they have a general tendency to comply with them anyway. This research
provides important insights into the effectiveness of PTAs as enforcement mech-
anisms of human rights standards, and, potentially, into international institutions
dealing with other issue areas in general. More precisely, our findings suggest
that international agreements do not have much coercing power per se, but are
only means to enforce law – such as human rights standards as in our case – if
governments are willing to do so.
The research note proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the
existent literature on the broader framework to which our work seeks to
contribute to: do international institutions affect world politics or rather reflect
them? We then discuss our theoretical argument, highlighting that the previous
research on PTAs and human rights standards has not yet accounted for
persistent selection effects, although we believe that there is a genuine need
for actually doing so. As a result, we then outline what kinds of implications
this has for the impact of hard law commitments in PTAs on the compliance
with human rights. Afterwards, we describe the data used for our empirical
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analysis, while the succeeding sections present our research design, the estima-
tion strategy, as well as our results and robustness checks. We finish the article
with a comprehensive discussion of our findings and implications for future
studies and policy makers.
2 Do International Institutions have the Potential to Affect World Politics?
The broader and more fundamental research question underlying our work is
whether international institutions and agreements affect world politics or instead
reflect them only (see Boehmer et al. 2004). On one hand, if countries join interna-
tional institutions such as PTAs simply after taking into account their expectations on
compliance already at the formation stage, this would lend support to a realist
perspective, which claims that these institutions do not have an independent or a
substantial effect on countries’ courses of action. Put differently, international institu-
tions then merely reflect existing interests (Downs et al. 1996; see also Hollyer and
Rosendorff 2011). On the other hand, if international institutions were to influence
countries’ policy decisions, perhaps independent of their design or underlying
country-specific preferences, we could subscribe to an institutionalist perspective,
which posits that international institutions are in fact more than ‘signaling devices’
(Boehmer et al. 2004).
That being said, a great amount of literature would confirm that international
institutions do indeed affect countries’ domestic policy decisions, and that they have
a real and independent impact. For example, several studies show that international
organizations exert influence by significantly reducing the risk of military conflict
between countries (Boehmer et al. 2004; Dorussen and Ward 2008; Oneal and Russett
1999). Membership in international institutions may also positively influence inter-
national trade (Ingram et al. 2005), environmental quality (Ward 2006; Spilker 2012),
or democratization processes (Pevehouse 2002).
Furthermore and directly pertaining to our focus on PTAs and human rights
compliance, Hafner-Burton (2005a) examines the conditions under which PTAs
may be effective in preventing domestic human rights abuses. She argues that PTAs
with hard human rights standards can rely on coercion (instead of reputational effects)
to influence their treaty members toward establishing and respecting human rights
standards. This stands in contrast to both PTAs with soft standards and regular human
rights treaties, which generally lack enforcement mechanisms. We believe that this
distinction seems important, since it shows that only those international agreements,
which link material benefits to the compliance with human rights standards, can
provoke their members to demonstrate a more substantial respect toward human
rights. By analyzing data on PTAs and the level of compliance with human rights
between 1976 and 2002, Hafner-Burton (2005a) finds empirical support for her
argument.
Contrary to this more optimistic view on the effectiveness of international
institutions, von Stein (2005) actually obtains evidence that international treaties
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have little constraining power. In her analysis of states’ commitments to Article VIII
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) treaty, von Stein (2005) demonstrates that
the factors, which make it more likely that states enter into internationally binding
agreements in the first place, affect countries’ propensity for compliance afterwards.3
This suggests that treaties merely have screening purposes than actual constraining
power.4 Instead, it is more likely that states demonstrate compliance with institutional
laws and regulations by making agreements rather shallow to ensure encompassing
membership. Under these circumstances, the policy changes demanded by interna-
tional institutions simply denote the ‘lowest common denominator’ and, thus, rather
small hurdles to clear.
The ‘lowest common denominator’ argument essentially points to the idea that
countries incorporate their expectations about compliance when negotiating interna-
tional agreements. Hence, it becomes difficult to determine what the effect of a
specific treaty may be or how it may look like when the typical state that ratifies
the treaty ‘possesses more of the state-level characteristics known to be associated
with good human rights practices than the typical nonratifier’ (Hill 2010: 1161; see
also Landman 2005).5
The idea of incorporating expectations about compliance is at the heart of
the rational design literature (e.g., Koremenos et al. 2001; Koremenos 2005). By
mainly focusing on uncertainty and flexibility, this literature argues that states will opt
for international forms of cooperation that can be described as soft law when facing
conditions of uncertainty. In turn, this occurs at the expense of agreements with clear
enforcement mechanisms that pertain to the hard law category (Abbott and Snidal
2000; Koremenos 2005). As a result, these arguments contend that countries are
aware of the ‘shadow of the future’ when designing international agreements. How-
ever, while these agreements may not necessarily address the problem at hand
effectively, they actually fit countries’ pragmatic anticipation on the prospective
policy change that will be possible given a (potential) member’s current policy level.
In the next section, we rely on this assertion when elaborating why PTAs are unlikely
to be effective in causing policy changes in issue areas such as human rights, labor
standards, or environmental protection.
3 However, Simmons and Hopkins (2005) criticize von Stein’s (2005) methodological approach. They
show that even if one accounts for the screening effects of Article VIII of the IMF treaty, there is still
significant constraining power to the treaty. We will come back to this methodological disagreement in our
research design section below.
4 Note that this also supports Downs et al.’s (1996) notion that the high levels of compliance we usually
observe in international governance do not necessarily mean that a deep level of cooperation has been
reached.
5 While previous research has already demonstrated that it is crucial to control for the factors that lead
countries to join an institution when analyzing the institution’s effectiveness (Hill 2010; Landman 2005;
von Stein 2005) our approach differs from previous research in at least one important way. The aim of these
previous studies was to show that countries’ decision to join an existing institution and compliance with this
institution’s regulations are related. Our research takes this argument one step further and shows that
countries design institutions, in our case PTAs, in a way that takes future compliance already into account.
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3 The Impact of Preferential Trade Agreements on Government Repression –
A Selection Perspective
The previous literature suggests that PTAs, in contrast to human rights agreements in
general, have a built-in enforcement mechanism if they are comprised of hard law
standards, i.e., if economic benefits from PTAs are in some way conditional upon
treaty members’ actions toward human rights. In more detail, the possibility to rely on
trade sanctions in case of non-compliance allows hard law PTAs to coerce their
members into changing their domestic policies as specified in the respective agree-
ment (Hafner-Burton 2005a). Although this argumentation sounds plausible, we
claim that it ignores a crucial step: it does not account for the formation stage of
these treaties, i.e., the stage in which countries negotiate and decide the terms to be
included and the level of commitment to be reached in a PTA. Moreover, this line of
reasoning does not take into account countries’ willingness in the first place to
comply with treaty regulations afterwards. If states are selective when deciding
whether to include hard human rights standards in a PTA or not, any analysis on
the effectiveness of PTAs in promoting human rights is likely to be biased unless we
control for this selection effect. In fact, following the rational design literature (e.g.,
Koremenos et al. 2001; Koremenos 2005), we would expect countries to be ‘forward
looking’ as they should take into account what may happen at the succeeding
enforcement stage already when they establish a particular institution, regime, or
treaty.
Correspondingly, we expect states to include hard human rights standards in
PTAs only if they themselves expect to comply with the human rights standards
as postulated in an agreement subsequently. The reason being that states if they
include tough human rights standards while knowing that they are unlikely to
abide by these standards are likely to face at least two risks. First, violating
these standards involves reputational costs for a state, since it thereby signals to
the present as well as to other potential treaty partners that it does not
necessarily adhere to its international obligations (see Hathaway 2002). Second,
a state might risk that the partner in a PTA does opt for enforcement. If the
counterpart of a defecting treaty member in a PTA observes the violation of the
human rights standards and is willing to use trade sanctions to enforce them,
the country will lose out from the gains of trade. Being aware of this
enforcement risk, a country that does not have a good human rights record
should simply not be willing to include any clause that may lead to the
enforcement of human rights standards in a PTA. Since a PTA without human
rights standards may also induce the same amount of trade liberalization and,
thus, the same potential gains from trade but does not involve any reputational
costs or the risk of enforcement in the event of non-compliance with a human
rights clause, there is no a-priori reason to actually add hard human rights
standards at all. Following this logic, we expect that only countries with a
good human rights record should be willing to add a hard human rights clause
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to a PTA they are entering.6 Similarly, this also implies that we should not observe
any impact of hard human rights standards in PTAs on states’ degree of human rights
compliance, once we control for the selection effect of including hard human rights
clauses in a PTA.7
We illustrate our rationale with two cases. In 2003, the European Union (EU)
established a PTA with Chile and Egypt, respectively. Whereas the treaty with Chile
included hard human rights standards, the one with Egypt did not contain any
reference to human rights at all. Following our argument, the selection process can
explain these outcomes during PTA formation. In the case of the EU-Chile agree-
ment, it was (and still is) unlikely that any (major) human rights violations would
emerge, since either actor is committed to democratic values. Hence, both the EU and
Chile should face little difficulties when signing a PTA containing hard human rights
standards, since they knew in advance that an enforcement situation was unlikely to
ever emerge. In contrast, when the EU and Egypt entered into their PTA, the calculations
for the two actors may have been somewhat different: as Egypt would have been
unlikely to change its human rights practices even if it had agreed on a PTA with a
hard human rights clause, the EU would have been faced with the option to enforce
the human rights standards. Enforcement, however, would have been associated with
vast reputational costs for Egypt and would have led to potential losses in the gains
from trade for both actors. Having said that, Egypt (and the EU as well) could simply
circumvent this dilemma by establishing a PTA containing no human rights commit-
ments, which, in turn, does neither risk losing any gains from trade nor begets any
reputational costs.
Arguably, this means that actors take into account the probability of enforcement
when establishing PTAs. We, therefore, claim that countries are aware of the ‘shadow of
the future’ and that they should conclude PTAs with hard human rights standards only in
those cases, in which they are likely to subsequently comply with the PTA’s human
rights regulations. Hence, and perhaps paradoxically, the inclusion of hard human rights
standards should thus primarily occur in those cases in which they are hardly necessary.
6 Hafner-Burton (2005a) seems to be aware of this potential selection effect. She argues that this should not
affect her results since countries with both good and bad human rights records tend to ratify PTAs with hard
law human rights standards. However, in another paper she shows that factors, such as a democratic
political system, significantly affect the likelihood of countries to enter into PTAs with hard human rights
standards (Hafner-Burton 2005b). Since democracies tend to have a higher respect for human rights, this
clearly supports our conjecture that those factors that lead countries to include hard human rights standards
are also the factors that are responsible for their compliance with these standards.
7 An objection to our argument could be that some states are eager to include hard human rights standards
in order to coerce their partner countries to respect human rights. However, this seems implausible, since
including tough human rights standards in a PTA, while knowing that the counterpart is unlikely to abide by
these standards, poses a severe challenge to a state. It can either choose not to enforce the standard, thereby
suffering from reputational costs or it can decide to enforce the standard, which is likely to result in losing
out on the gains of trade. Similar to the argument above then, actors should simply avoid this enforcement
dilemma by including hard human rights standards only in those cases in which their counterparts are likely
to abide by these standards anyway.
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In contrast, countries should rely on soft or no human rights standards when they expect
that they (or their treaty partner) will violate human rights.
4 Research Design
4.1 Data
To examine the effect of hard human rights standards in PTAs on countries’ compli-
ance with human rights, we use the country-year as the unit of analysis and merged
existing data on human rights compliance and various covariates described in detail
below with newly compiled information on PTAs between 1976 and 2009.8 Due to
the methodological approach, observations with missing values had to be deleted
case-wise. Ultimately, our time-series cross-section data are comprised of 4,117
country-years for 174 countries with 249 PTAs in total.
4.2 Dependent Variable
We measure the extent to which a country complies with human rights standards via
its level of political repression. Following Hafner-Burton (2005a: 615), political
repression is operationalized by the level of political terror, i.e., data on ‘murder,
torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged
detention without charges; disappearance or clandestine detention; and other flagrant
violations of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.’ This variable
draws on two data sources. The first one is Poe and Tate (1994) who compiled data on
153 governments’ reported levels of political terror from 1976 to 1993; the second one
pertains to Gibney et al. (2005; 2011) who collected repression data from 1980 to 2009
across a somewhat different sample of 141 states and territories. The information in
both sources was collected via content analysis of annual human rights reports issued
by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. Our final item follows a 5-
point ordinal scale that combines the information of both Gibney et al. (2011) and Poe
and Tate (1994), and ultimately follows Gibney et al.’s (2011) operationalization of
the Political Terror Scale. In other words, those years that are not covered by the
Political Terror Scale are imputed with data from Poe and Tate (1994). Table 1 gives
an overview about this item.
4.3 Explanatory Variables
We consider states’ decisions to include hard human rights standards in PTAs as our core
factor of interest. More specifically, in order to construct a dichotomous variable for hard
law PTAs, we coded 249 different PTAs by analyzing the content of all formal PTA
contracts,9 where the ‘explicit adoption of human rights language and principles, and
8 1977 constitutes the ‘effective’ starting year for the time period under study, since all our explanatory
variables are lagged by one year.
9 This includes treaties, protocols, and other forms of amendments.
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whether the benefits accorded by the contract formally depend on those principles’
(Hafner-Burton 2005a: 615) signaled whether a PTA in question was comprised of
hard human rights law or not. Our first explanatory variable, PTA hard law, thus
measures state membership with PTAs supplying hard standards: an observation takes
on a value of 1 in a specific year if a state belongs to any PTAwith hard law human rights
standards. Using this treatment variable allows us to test whether PTAs that incorporate
human rights standards with an enforcement mechanism (i.e., hard standards) differ
from those PTAs that incorporate soft human rights standards in general and from those
PTAs that do not incorporate any human rights standards at all.
Next to the core variable, we also control for other influences on the level of
political repression. We largely follow Hafner-Burton’s (2005a) approach and oper-
ationalizations here. First, in order to differentiate the impact of human rights stand-
ards in PTAs from a countries’ general commitment to international human rights
agreements, we include information on ratification, succession, and accession to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against
Torture, respectively. The final item, i.e., human rights ratification, is an ordinal
variable ranging from 0 to 2. Those values are derived from the total number of the
two treaties that a state has ratified into national law by any given year.10
Second, population pressure can exacerbate resource scarcity and, thus, increase
the likelihood that states use repression to control civil violence (Henderson 1993;
Poe and Tate 1994). We therefore consider a second control variable that measures a
state’s population density per square kilometer. We retrieved the data from the World
Bank Development Indicators and lag it by one year for our estimations.
10 This approach does not take into account that countries can ratify a human rights treaty while exempting
itself from certain obligations by using reservations (Landman 2005; Neumayer 2007). However, in order
for our results to be closely comparable to the study of Hafner-Burton (2005a) we decided to use a simple
ratification measure and not a weighted ratification measure that takes reservations into account.
Table 1 Political repression worldwide, 1977–2009 (original sample before matching)
Value Description Frequency Percent
1 Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view,
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
721 17.51
2 There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity.
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional.
Political murder is rare.
1,211 29.41
3 There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be
common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views
is accepted.
1,294 31.43
4 Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life.
In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest
themselves in politics or ideas.
632 15.35
5 Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue
personal or ideological goals.
259 6.29
Total 4,117 100.00
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A combination of democratic values, democratic institutions, transparency, and the
promotion of civil liberties are crucial determinants of a country’s tendency to comply
with human rights accords (Henderson 1991; Poe et al. 1999; Cingranelli and Richards
1999; see also Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Keith 1999; Gould 2004; Hathaway
2002; Schwarz 2004; Neumayer 2005). Similarly, albeit different, regime transitions
and political instability influence the regime type of a country and, in turn, could
affect the propensity toward repression by the government (Henderson 1991; Poe et
al. 1999; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; see also Mitchell and McCormick 1988;
Keith 1999; Gould 2004; Hathaway 2002; Schwarz 2004; Neumayer 2005). In
addition, transitions into democracies could increase the chances of forming hard
law PTAs, since new regimes (or leaders) might want to signal their commitment and
‘tie their hands’ (see Hathaway 2002). For capturing these rationales, we incorporate
the following variables. First, we operationalize a country’s level of democracy via
the polity2 item (democracy) of the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).11
Second, political stability additionally counts the number of years since a state has
undergone a structural regime transition, defined as a movement on democracy of
three points or more (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Note that this item also corrects for
temporal dependencies as it essentially measures the movement of a country’s
democracy score over time (see Beck et al. 1998).12 Both variables are lagged by
one year.
Forth, GDP per capita measures a country’s gross domestic product per capita in
constant U.S. dollars. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) argue for the ‘simple poverty
thesis,’ i.e., that a lack of economic resources creates a fertile ground for political
conflict and governmental political repression. Furthermore, ‘in an advanced economy
where people are likely to have fewer grievances, political stability is often achieved
more easily, reducing the likelihood of human rights violations’ (Hafner-Burton
2005a: 617; see also Pritchard 1989; Henderson 1991). The data for this variable
stem from the World Bank Development Indicators, and we log the variable and lag it
by one year.
Finally, we draw on the sum of a state’s total exports and imports of goods and
services measured as a share of GDP in order to operationalize trade. This variable
controls for the impact of financial and market transactions on countries’ tendency to
comply with human rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards et al. 2001).13
Similar to GDP per capita above, the World Bank Development Indicators provide us
11 Missing values pertaining to microstates were replaced with data from Gleditsch (2008). More specif-
ically, the original Polity IV data omit values of microstates. Gleditsch (2008), however, collected these
data.
12 Although political stability should address temporal dependencies due to its operationalization as a
yearly count item, some of these dependencies might persist. We therefore also estimate a model with a
torture-years variable (i.e., time in years elapsed since a country scored the value 3 or higher on political
repression) and different sets of cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998).
13 In order to address this mechanism, Hafner-Burton (2005a: 617) also considers a variable on countries’
inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment. We decided to drop this ‘FDI investment’ variable due to
three reasons. First, it theoretically addresses the same concerns as trade, which we do include. Second,
Hafner-Burton’s (2005a) variable is statistically insignificant throughout any of her model estimations,
rendering it unlikely that this item will crucially affect our results. Finally, the World Bank Development
Indicators as the source for the investment variable suffer from missing values.
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with the necessary information, while the final variable is logged and lagged by one
year. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics.
4.4 Methodological Approach: Genetic 1:1 Matching with Replacement
As argued above, countries that agree to include hard human rights standards in their
PTAs should differ in important and predictable ways from those countries that do not
want to include these standards in their PTAs. Hence, this treatment departs from
Hafner-Burton (2005a). For comparison, we tried to replicate her results here and our
estimations are summarized in Table 3. While the descriptive statistics in Table 2
demonstrate that our data are very close to Hafner-Burton’s (2005a: 616) operation-
alizations14 – although our variables do not fully match her items – Table 3 further
emphasizes this, since our models below are virtually identical to Hafner-Burton’s
(2005a: 619) Table 2. Most importantly, PTA hard law exerts a substantial and
significantly negative impact on governmental repression. This finding holds, regard-
less if we extend Hafner-Burton’s (2005) temporal domain or employ our variable
specifications as outlined above.
However, and according to our theory, we claim that this might be misleading
and actually driven by a selection process, since tough human rights standards
should be systematically included in PTAs due to certain kinds of country interests
or domestic characteristics (see Hill 2010).15 Previous research dealt with this problem
either through an instrumental variable approach or the use of selection estimators.
However, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) demonstrate that these purely parametric
strategies are inaccurate in addressing non-random assignments, since they rely on
unverifiable modeling assumptions and are generally not able to deal with the
influence of other existent covariates. In turn, this may lead to the underestimation
of the actual effect of hard human rights law in PTAs and, thus, the results are
potentially biased.
Matching is a more effective solution to these problems as it corrects for the non-
random assignment while controlling for the existence of confounding factors. More
specifically, matching pre-processes the data to form quasi-experimental contrasts by
sampling a subset of comparable cases from the overall pool of observations. The
observations contained in this subset resemble each other as closely as possible, i.e.,
the differences due to confounding factors are reduced to a minimum. The only – and
actually crucial – exception is that these ‘most-similar’ cases differ in whether they
received the treatment (PTA hard law) or not. After the matching, we can estimate the
effect of the treatment by analyzing the matched sample using parametric methods in
14 Despite several attempts, unfortunately, we were unable to obtain Hafner-Burton’s (2005a) original data.
15 One could argue that there is another selection process that already occurs at the stage when countries
decide to enter into a PTA and, hence, that we should model first which countries form a PTA (Hafner-
Burton 2005b). Although we do see that there might be a selection process that drives which countries form
a PTA, we refrain from modeling this process here, since it is unlikely that it affects countries’ decisions on
whether to include hard human rights standards or not therein. Put differently, states should enter into PTAs
because of reasons pertaining to their trading relationship – and not because of reasons pertaining to their
compliance with human rights. Therefore, ignoring this first selection process in our analysis should not
bias our results.
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order to control for any remaining imbalances (see Ho et al. 2007; Morgan and
Winship 2007). Here, we use orderd logit models, and also cluster the standard errors
by country to correct for the bias due to non-constant variances and for taking into
account intra-group correlations.
5 Empirical Findings
In a first step, we employ genetic one-to-one matching with replacement (Diamond
and Sekhon 2013; see also Sekhon 2007). These specifications proved to maximize
the balance between the treatment and control group, respectively, and ultimately we
obtain a matched sample of 2,754 observations for a reference to hard human rights
Table 2 Descriptive statistics, 1977–2009 (original sample before matching)
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Repression 4,117 2.635 1.126 1 5
PTA hard law 4,117 0.334 0.472 0 1
Human rights ratification 4,117 1.136 0.826 0 2
Population density 4,117 109.088 309.067 1.322 6,913.43
Political stability 4,117 23.986 30.348 0 199
Democracy 4,117 1.897 7.306 −10 10
GDP per capita 4,117 7.465 1.583 4.390 10.749
Trade 4,117 4.157 0.552 1.844 6.082
Table 3 PTAs and human rights compliance – Hafner-Burton (2005a: 619) replication
Model 1 (1977–2002) Model 2 (1977–2009) Model 3 (own specifications
before matching)
PTA hard law −0.377 (0.162)** −0.442 (0.146)*** −0.318 (0.193)*
PTA soft law 0.157 (0.148) 0.257 (0.145)*
Human rights ratification 0.172 (0.067)*** 0.231 (0.063)*** 0.574 (0.116)***
Population density 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)***
Political stability −0.006 (0.002)** −0.004 (0.002)* −0.014 (0.005)***
Democracy −0.036 (0.009)*** −0.036 (0.008)*** −0.080 (0.016)***
GDP per capita −0.156 (0.046)*** −0.186 (0.045)*** −0.404 (0.089)***
Trade −0.419 (0.092)*** −0.389 (0.091)*** −1.034 (0.016)***
FDI investment 0.008 (0.006) 0.009 (0.004)**
Obs 2,861 3,788 4,117
Log pseudolikelihood −2,342.07 −3,021.72 −5,243.55
Wald χ2 1,358.92*** 1,552.26*** 142.44***
Table entries are coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Temporal
corrections as specified in Hafner-Burton (2005a: 615) are included in Models 1–2, but omitted from table
* significant at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level, *** at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
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standards in PTAs due to the fact that our original data identified 1,377 PTA country-
years that included hard law human rights standards. We used the following variables
to match on, i.e., to achieve a maximum of balance between observations from the
treatment group with those from the control group with respect to all variables
outlined above: trade, democracy, and human rights ratification. Again, consider-
ations on the balance between the subsamples influenced this decision, as this set of
variables proved to be optimal with regard to the overall achieved balance.
We refrained from matching on all explanatory variables due to two reasons. First,
this would not avoid matched datasets with still significant imbalances. In fact, the
three variables trade, democracy, and human rights ratification we matched on
induced the highest balance between treated and control observations than any other
combination of variables. Second and in the words of Ho et al. (2007: 216f):
the theoretical literature emphasizes that including variables only weakly relat-
ed to treatment assignments usually reduces bias more than it will increase
variance, and so most believe that all available control variables should always
be included. However, the theoretical literature has focused primarily on the
case where the pool of potential control units is considerably larger than the set
of treated units. Some researchers seem to have incorrectly generalized this
advice to all datasets. If, as is often the case, the pool of potential control units is
not much larger than the pool of treated units, then always including all
available control variables is bad advice. Instead, the familiar econometric rules
apply about the trade-off between the bias of excluding relevant variables and
the inefficiency of including irrelevant ones: researchers should not include
every pre-treatment covariate available.
Our approach, thus, corresponds to the general genetic algorithm used by Sekhon
(2007: 12ff), which maximizes the smallest p-value for t-tests in each iteration of the
matching procedure.
Before and after we conducted the matching, we assessed the degree of distribu-
tional balance of our explanatory items between the treatment and the control group.
Figure 1 depicts our findings via two common balance statistics. With regard to the
left panel, a standardized bias within [−0.25; 0.25] indicates that a variable is well
balanced (Ho et al. 2007: 220). In terms of the second panel, we report the p-values of
t-tests (0.10 as threshold level) for identifying if real differences between the treat-
ment and the control group do persist. Evidently, the distributions of most explana-
tory variables significantly differed between the treated and the control group before
we matched observations. After the matching, however, our sample displays a
substantially improved balance to the extent that we can hardly distinguish between
observations in either group and the only real difference between observations is
actually the treatment of PTA hard law. More specifically, all standardized biases
range within [0.25; -0.25] and the p-values are mostly well above the value of 0.1.
However, the latter balance statistic also shows that differences between the treatment
and the control group seem to persist for human rights ratification in our matched
sample. We address this point in the robustness checks of the online appendix.
As indicated above, Ho et al. (2007: 211f) suggest using the same parametric
estimator for the matched data one would have employed in the first place, i.e., before
the matching. Due to the use of the matched sample, however, the importance of the
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functional form that is characteristic for any parametric estimator is significantly
lowered, specification assumptions matter less, and the reliability of the results is
more strongly given. Table 4 summarizes our results from the final models that rely
on the matched data.16
In total, we estimate four models to demonstrate that our findings are robust and
take the censoring of the impact of PTAs’ reference to hard human rights standards on
political repression into account. Recall that we postulated that the impact of hard law
human rights standards in PTAs should disappear as soon as we account for the
outlined selection process. And indeed, unlike in Table 3 above or Hafner-Burton
(2005a), PTA hard law is highly insignificant throughout Models 4–7. As demon-
strated in Table 4 and more thoroughly in the online appendix, adding or excluding
controls from the models does not alter this result.17 The confidence in the empirical
support for our theory is further increased by Fig. 2, where we employed King et al.’s
(2000) software package clarify in order to calculate first differences for scoring any
of the five values of political repression while increasing PTA hard law from 0 to 1
and holding all other variables at their respective means.
16 With regard to the included control items in Models 4–7, note that a common interpretation is generally
not possible, since the matching technique seeks to address and control for the imbalances of those
variables between the treatment and control group in the first place. Hence, we only include those items
in our models in order to control for any remaining imbalances.
17 The online appendix and the replication material for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at
the journal’s website: http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/journal/11558.
Fig. 1 Matching: Balance statistics – PTA hard law. Dashed lines mark specific threshold levels (or
intervals) for respective balance statistic. Balance statistics before matching might be covered by balance
statistics after matching
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Figure 2 essentially mirrors our findings from Table 4, since PTA hard law does
not exert any significant or substantial impact on either value of political repression.
In fact and independent from model specifications, we observe increases or decreases
in the predicted probability that are close to 0 and the 90 % confidence intervals
permanently cross that threshold as well. Hence, the impact of PTA hard law on
states’ levels of human rights compliance cannot be distinguished from 0 as soon as
we take into account the underlying selection process. This contradicts Hafner-Burton
(2005a), who finds that hard law human rights standards improve a country’s
compliance. However, the finding is strongly in line with our theoretical rationale
that controls for selection. States are aware of the ‘shadow of the future’ and, hence,
already take into account what may happen at the succeeding enforcement stage when
establishing a particular PTA. This implies that actors agree on hard human rights
standards in PTAs only if they have a general propensity to abide by human rights in
the first place. If this general propensity does not exist, hard law references to human
rights compliance are unlikely to be included in PTAs, which in turn leads to the
observed insignificance of PTA hard law.
6 Conclusion
This article has sought to expand our understanding of the impact of PTAs on
countries’ levels of political repression and compliance with human rights standards.
While the recent literature suggests that PTAs can substantially decrease human rights
abuses when they include hard human rights standards, it treated PTAs, their impact,
and their surrounding influences in an undifferentiated or truncated manner. We,
therefore, developed a theoretical model that considers PTAs in a selection process:
countries agree on including hard law human rights standards in PTAs only if they
Table 4 The impact of hard law PTAs on human rights compliance, 1977–2009: Matched sample
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
PTA hard law −0.058 (0.250) −0.123 (0.214) −0.041 (0.212) 0.191 (0.195)
Human rights ratification 0.734 (0.156)*** 0.672 (0.160)***
Population density 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Political stability −0.013 (0.006)** −0.013 (0.006)** −0.010 (0.006)*
Democracy −0.124 (0.016)*** −0.088 (0.016)*** −0.086 (0.016)***
GDP per capita −0.412 (0.111)*** −0.461 (0.115)*** −0.289 (0.101)***
Trade −0.761 (0.236)*** −0.661 (0.238)*** −0.675 (0.220)***
Years since torture −0.425 (0.040)***
Obs 2,754 2,754 2,754 2,754
Log pseudolikelihood −4,094.484 −3,328.300 −3,408.573 −3,058.422
Wald χ2 0.05 160.41*** 102.05*** 468.19***
Table entries are coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Cubic splines
(Beck et al. 1998) included in Model 7, but omitted from table
* significant at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05 level, *** at 0.01 level (two-tailed)
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intend to comply with these standards anyway, i.e., if there is a general tendency to
abide by human rights in the first place.
Our findings suggest that PTAs – regardless of what kind of legalization level they
employ for demanding human rights compliance – do not have any impact on states’
level of political repression. This supports the idea that countries are forward-looking
when they establish international institutions as they take the succeeding enforcement
stage into account when deciding whether to include human rights standards in their
PTAs. This leads to the paradoxical situation that enforceable human rights standards
are included in those circumstances in which they are needed the least. In addition,
our results emphasize that international agreements do not have much coercing power
per se, but are only means to enforce law – such as human rights standards as in our
case – if governments are willing to do so in the first place. Put differently, these
international agreements seem to merely reflect existing interests rather than affect
governments’ actions.
Against this background, although this analysis here demonstrates a great deal of
empirical support for our theoretical argument, other important questions remain. For
example, it is possible that countries that belong to many PTAs with enforceable human
rights standards behave differently from those that only belong to one such PTA.
Furthermore, although our results show that PTAs do not significantly lower countries’
human rights abuses, we did not explicitly examine the argument that the counterpart in
a PTA could potentially have an interest in influencing the other country’s human rights
record. However, we tend to cast doubt on this argumentation, since, as outlined above,
including tough human rights standards in a PTAwhile knowing that the counterpart is
unlikely to abide by these standards poses a severe challenge to a country: it can either
Fig. 2 First difference estimates calculated using simulated parameter values (King et al. 2000). Estimate of first
difference represented by x. Dashed lines signify 90 % confidence interval. Solid line marks 0-threshold
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choose not to enforce the standard, thereby suffering from reputational costs and
damages or it can decide to enforce the standard which is likely to result in losing out
on the gains of trade. Similar to the argument made in this article, a country should
simply avoid this enforcement dilemma by including hard human right standards only in
those cases in which the countries are likely to abide by these standards anyway.
However, future research has to unveil whether this is indeed the case.
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